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TORTS
DUANE ANDERSONO and J. ALLEN SMITH"*
This article relies on some 140 cases that arose in Florida during the
past two years;' they are presumably all of that period that can be readily
recognized as (I) sounding in tort and (2) turning, for purposes of the
decision, on substantive tort principles. Two conalusions stand foremost:
one is that when troubles come they come not single file but in battalions,
with the result that the Florida Supreme Court finds it necessary to give
much of its time to cases that differ factually somewhat but that add
little of interest to existing doctrine;2 consequently, this article does not
attempt to analyze separately each reported decision; the second is that
a tort still has to be defined negatively as not a contract,3 with a result
that in prohibiting complete coverage to writers, the scope of tort liability
permits them a dangerously wide range of selection and an uncontrolled
degree of discretion. These notes, then, consciously leave out such matters
as subterranean water rights,4 significant problems of evidence and procedure
that may, in litigation be of more importance than the substantive tort
law, and, the half dozen or so cases on public and private nuisance that
lodge chiefly in equity."
The material for this article is divided into the following three main
topics and sub-topics:
THE INTENTIONAL TORTS
I. Assault and Battery
II. Conversion
III. False Imprisonment
IV. Malicious Prosecution
V. Defamation
*Member of the Florida Bar.
"Member of the Florida Bar. Formerly Assistant Professor, University of
Florida College of Law.
1. The cases covered are reported in Volumes 58 through 67 Southern Reporter
2nd Series.
2. Some ten or more cases merely sustained the findings of the jury, e.g.,
Loftin v. Nixon, 53 So.2d 823 (Fla. 1951); Bulmer v. Strawn, 53 So.2d 315 (Fla.
1951); Atlantic Coast Line R. v. Smith, 53 So.2d 301 (Fla. 1951).
3. For a trenchant analysis of tort liability see COHEN & Coswx, READINCS IN
JURISPRUDENCE 196 (1st ed. 1951).
4. Labruzzo v. Atlantic Dredging & Const. Co., 54 So.2d 673 (Fla. 1951).
5. State v. Franklin Press, 61 So.2d 508 (Fla. 1952) (sports sheet held not a
nuisance); MeCloskey v. Martin, 56 So.2d 916 (Fla. 1952) (sign blocking restaurant
constitutes a nuisance); State v. Miami, 53 So.2d 636 (Fla. 1951) (garbage disposal
plant not a nuisance); Reaver v. Martin Theatres of Florida, 52 So.2d 682 (Fla. 1951)
drive-in next to airport not a nuisance); Burnett v. Rushton, 52 So.2d 645 (Fla. 1951)
noisy neighbors constituted a nuisance).
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THE NEGLIGENCE CASES
I. The Meaning and Proof of Negligence
Duty and Reasonable Care
Proximate Cause
Foreseeability
Attractive Nuisance
Res Ipsa Loquitur
IT. Contributory Fault and Defenses
Contributory Negligence
Assumption of Risk
Imputed Negligence
Last Clear Chance
III. Vicarious Liability
IV. Statutory Problems
Workmen's Compensation
Death by Wrongful Act
The Guest Statute
The Jones Act
Railroad Statutes
V. A Study in Slip and Fall
VI. Contract or Tort
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY AND COROLLARY RULES
THE INTENTIONAL TORTS
The intentional torts, as distinct from the negligent torts, were
represented during the period under survey by approximately a dozen cases,
almost half of which involved the torts of defamation, libel and slander.
I. Assault and Battery
The ancient torts of assault and battery arose in only one situation:0
a county judge struck a disabled veteran after the veteran called the judge
a liar. Justice Terrell in an interesting concurring opinion took judicial
notice that name-calling has "long been a part of the fighting folklore of
the rural South" but deprecated violent reaction to it by a judicial officer.7
The veteran recovered damages, since in the absence of a statute, as in
Mississippi,8 words are not an adequate provocation for a battery. Nor
did the court clothe the judge with any immunity as a result of his judicial
position, such as he might have enjoyed in a case of false imprisonment
or slander.0 The most interesting feature of the case is the broad base
6. Anderson v. Maddox, 65 So.2d 299 (Fla. 1953).
7. Id. at 301.
8. MIss. CODE AN. § 1059 (1942)
9. E.g., Rush v. Buckley, 100 Me. 322, 61 Ati. 774 (1905) (false imprisonment);
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provided by the court for the assessment of damages. Once the tort is
established, damages for actual physical harn become possibly a minor
item; embarrassment, humiliation, and degradation each may take its
toll, and the court expressly declares punitive damages appropriate to the
verdict.'0
II. Conversion
The one complaint in conversion was denied by the court, which
disposed of the case on property principles of abandonment." There
were no cases in trespass to personal property or of simple trespass
to land.
III. False Imprisonment
In false imprisonment, the court, in one case, allowed a plaintiff
to recover punitive damages from a municipal judge, who with imputed
knowledge that he exceeded his jurisdiction, nevertheless ordered the rearrest
of the plaintiff who was free on writ of habeas corpus. 12 This allowance
of punitive damages is difficult to reconcile with the older and leading
case in Florida on false imprisonment, Winn & Lovett v. Archer.18 There,
the court upheld compensatory damages but rejected punitive damages,
even though the defendant, through a servant, locked up the plaintiff,
an elderly woman, in a small room and subjected her to false charges,
verbal abuse, and marked humiliation. The difference lies in a broader
interpretation of the word malice now given by the court. Now the court
construes malice as "a wrongful act without reasonable excuse" 4 and
not as behavior based on anger or vindictiveness. In a second and final
case during the two-year period just past, the court rejected a claim
in false imprisonment in a situation where the sheriff and his deputies
acted under color of office and without actual knowledge. 15
IV. Malicious Prosecution
Despite the adage that actions for malicious prosecution are not
favored in law, the judges, in the three cases before them, awarded
Irwin v. Ashurst, 158 Ore. 61, 74 P.2d 1127 (1938) (defamation); see also Karelas v.
Baldwin, 237 App. Div. 265, 261 N.Y. Supp. 518 (2d Dep't 1932).
10. In reversing the lower court in Anderson v. Maddox, 65 So.2d 299, 301
(Fla. 1953) Justice Thomas said:
We think the appellant was entitled to a determination by a jury of his
actual damages, and, if he proved to the jury's satisfaction, to have the
jury fix the amount of punitive damages as well.
11. Howard v. Sharlin, 61 So.2d 181 (Fla. 1952).
12. Farish v. Smoot, 58 So.2d 534 (Fla. 1952) (Roberts, J. dissenting); Comment,
6 FLA. L. REv. 259 (1953). See also Florida Synopsis, 7 MIAMI L.Q. 564 (1953).
13. 126 Fla. 308, 171 So. 214 (1936); but see Setzer v. Tyre, 126 Fla. 139, 140,
171 So. 224, 225 (1936), which allowed punitive damages where plaintiff was not
only falsely imprisoned but also beaten.
14. Farish v. Smoot, 58 So.2d 534, 538 (Fla. 1952).
15. Warren v. Hall, 66 So.2d 230 (Fla. 1953).
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substantial damages to all plaintiffs. The cases involved unjust prosecution
for forgery and larceny. 18 Other than suggesting a trend toward easier
recovery, the opinions indicate no major doctrinal changes. In determining
fair damages, however, the court clearly approved a basis that takes into
consideration the ability of the defendant to pay. To this end, Justice
Mathews states: "A verdict of $1,000 against a man with a small amount
of property, or against a man who earns his living 'by the sweat of his
brow' may be severe punishment, while the same amount of damages
against a man worth a quarter of a million dollars would be no
punishment."' 7 The court further pointed up the atavistic overcalls that
intentional torts still show of their criminal-law past by awarding punitive
damages as a concomitant to recovery. The court helpfully re-outlined
the five text-book elements of the offense: (1) the instigation of the criminal
proceeding by the defendant; (2) its termination in favor of the plaintiff;
(3) the exercise of malice by the defendant; (4) want of probable cause
for the prosecution; and (5) damages.' 8 Elements (3) and (4) remain
difficult to define precisely, and, as might be expected, two of the three
defendants presented as their chief defense semantic exercises within the
framework of "probable cause" and "malice." Since the court allows the
jury to accept or reject these elements, it is probable that they are, in
effect, one and the same to be deduced from the behavior of the
defendants. 19
V. Defamation
The past two years evidenced considerable activity in the area of
defamation though no case appeared at all to test the related right of
privacy,20 and in conformity with standard doctrine, the court held it
libelous for one to falsely accuse a merchant, in writing, for refusing to
pay his bills.2 1 In a second case the court went further to hold that words
broadcast over the radio are actionable if the natural result is to impute
hatred to another or to prejudice him in his occupation.22 In still another
case involving numerous unseemly statements by members of a group
concerning a fellow member, the court discussed the difference between
16. Killen v. Olsen, 59 So.2d 524 (Fla. 1952) (two Justices dissenting) (larceny);
Maiborne v. Kuntz, 56 So.2d 720 (Fla. 1952) (larceny); Glass v. Parrish, 51 So.2d
717 (Fla. 1951) (forgery).
17. Maiborne v. Kuntz, 56 So.2d 720, 722 (Fla. 1952).
18. Glass v. Parrish, 51 So.2d 717 (Fla. 1951). See also Ward v. Allen, 152
Fla. 82, 11 So.2d 193 (1942); Duval Jewelry Co. v. Smith, 107 Fla. 717, 136 So. 878
(1931). See also Florida Synopsis, 3 MAMI L.Q. 292 (1949).
19. See Perez v. Rodriguez, 155 Fla. 501, 20 So.ld 654 (1945) (one Justice
dissenting).
20. The leading Florida case concerning the right of privacy, Cason v. Baskin,
155 Fla. 198, 20 So.2d 243 (1944) established the right and recognized the new
tort but seems in practice to have precluded any substantial recovery.
21. Hartley & Parker, Inc. v. Copeland, 51 So.2d 789 (Fla. 1951).
22. Richard v. Gray, 62 So.2d 597 (Fla. 1953). See Berry & Goodrich, Political
Defamation: Radio's Dilemma, 1 FLA. L. REv. 343 (1948). Note. 3 MIAMI L.O.
312 (1949).
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mere insult which is not actionable, and slander;23 it further indicated
the necessity in some instances to prove special damages as distinct
from those situations that, being slanderous per se, are actionable without
a showing of special damages. 24 A neat defense appeared in Campbell v.
Jacksonville Kennel Club, Inc.,25 a case that also pointed up the distinction
between slander per quod and slander per se. One set of words, classified
as slander per se, failed to constitute a cause of action, since the words
were said to a joint adventurer only and not published; the second set,
classified as slanderous per quod, though published, were not shown to have
caused special damage.
The final case, Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Brown,26 construed a
Florida statute27 that is basically a piece of special legislation limiting the
liability of newspapers, hence considerably altering the common law. Urged
to construe the words "actual damages" to mean "special damages" and to
preclude recovery by libelled parties who must rest on general damages
alone, the court refused to go so far and held that the statute did not
change the common law to such an extent, and that "actual damages"
meant "general damages." However, the court denied recovery in the
premises and the opinion is probably not definitive of the issue. 28
THE NEGLIGENCE CASES
Despite the occasional importance of intentional torts, the more
important field of litigation lies in the law of negligence. Since the
theoretical framework of this branch of the law is copiously treated in
textbooks, the following discussion is limited to the principal factual
situations that arose and the particular doctrines that received emphasis
by the court in deciding these recent cases.
I. The Meaning and Proof of Negligence
Duty and reasonable care.-At the outset, of course, there is no
negligence, and no recovery, if the defendant (1) owes no duty to the
23. Loeb v. Geronemus, 66 So.2d 241 (Fa. 1953); See Comment, Distinction
Between Insult and Slander Per Quod, 3 FLA. L. REV. 133 (1950).
24. The meaning of the term libel per se is not thoroughly clear in the Florida
decisions and the federal case of Caldwell v. Crowell-Collier Pub. Co., 161 F.2d 333(5th Cir. 1947) reflects this uncertainty. Technically all libellous words are actionable
per se; it is only in slander that categorization becomes necessary and then the term
slander per se becomes meaningful to indicate those narrow and few instances in
which special damages need not be shown. See generally, PROssER, LAW OF TORTS793-809 (1941).
25. 66 So.2d 495 (Fla. 1953).
26. 66 So.2d 679 (Fla. 1953).
27. FLA. STAT. § 770.02 (1951).
28. For another important example of special help, this time judicial, for the
organs of the press, see Layne v. Tribune Co., 108 Fla. 177, 146 So. 234 (1933), which
according to SHULNMAN & JAMES, CASES ON TORTS 1011 (1942) probably represents a
lone position. The Tribune Co. case was cited with approval in Hartley & Parker Inc.
v. Copeland, 51 So.2d 789 (Fla. 1951).
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plaintiff or (2) if, admitting the existence of a duty, the defendant acts
reasonably, properly, and prudently in the premises. Several recent cases
are useful examples of these two aspects of a fundamental problem. In
Michmond v. Florida Power & Light Co.,20 the court upheld a summary
judgment for the power company on the theory that the company owed
no duty to a kite flyer, who was shocked by unguarded wires, to insulate
the wires or post warning signs. The case includes a good discussion by
Mr. Justice rfllomas on the social utility of the act, on the one hand,
as opposed to the risk involved, on the other. The court could have
treated the case in the more usual method of admitting a duty to the
public on the part of the power company by allowing the trial court or
jury to decide whether the power company used reasonable care. 0 The
court also, in another case, followed the traditional common law view
that a tortfcasor owes no duty to a wife for her loss of consortium occasioned
by the tortfcasor's breach of duty to her husband."
The concept of duty was further developed in a case involving injuries
to a cab passenger who followed the driver of the cab to observe the
changing of a tire and who was struck by a passing vehicle. -2 The court
sustained a directed verdict for the defendant cab company. Apparently,
had it been shown that the plaintiff was so drunk as not to be in control
of his actions, the cab company would then have owed a duty to the
defendant to supervise his behavior.
In Miami Paper Co. v. Johnston,3 the court conceded the duty of a
truck driver toward children who might be playing in the streets and
directed its attention instead to whether the truck driver had exercised
reasonable care. The court concluded that the question was one for
the determination of a jury and upheld its findings of negligence.
Proximate cause.-The court in Eli Vitt Cigar & Tobacco Co.
Matatis0 4 had before it the problem of proximate cause, that is, to what
extent is the defendant liable once a duty and breach of duty are proved.
In that case the plaintiff had been injurcd by the defendant's automobile.
Some three weeks later the plaintiff in climbing to an attic was seized
with a dizzy spell, fell, and received additional injuries. The court, citing
29. 58 So.2d 687 (Fla. 1952).
30. See Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Tampa Elec. Co., 60 So.2d 179 (la. 1952).
MORRIs, TORTS 139 (1953). The standard of care, with notable exceptions chiefly
involving common carriers and special statutes, remains constant; that which an
ordinary, reasonable and prudent person similarly situated would exercise; it is the
factual situation that varies. F.E.C. News Co. v. Pearce, 58 So.Zd 843 (Hla. 1952).
Cf. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Smith, 53 So.2d 301 (Fla. 1951).
31. Ripley v. Ewell, 61 So.2d 420 (Fla. 1952) (Mr. Justice Terrell dissented);
accord, Smith v. Nicholas Bldg. Co., 93 Ohio St. 101, 112 N.E. 204 (1915).
32. Swilley v. Economy Cab Co. of Jacksonville, 56 So.2d 914 (Fla. 1951); Cf.
Middleton v. Whitridge, 213 N.Y. 499, 108 N.E. 192 (1915).
33. 58 So.2d 869 (Fla. 1952) (Mr. Justice Thomas dissented). Factually the case
was a close one. The driver properly took a number of precautions but failed to look in
front of the truck where a child was playing.
34. 55 So.2d 549 (Fla. 1951).
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the Restatement of Torts, 5 held the defendant liable for all the additional
injuries on the grounds that they arose as a direct consequence of the
earlier tort.
Foreseeability.-The notion that defendants are liable to plaintiffs only
for forsecable consequences of the tortious act, is, of course, well recognized
and was made famous by Cardozo's opinion in Palsgra( v. Long Island
R. R. Co.O The problem arose in Railway Express Agency v. Brabharn,.7
in a decision that divided the court four to three as and remains, perhaps,
as the most intriguing case of the period from a theoretical viewpoint. It
deserves an article by itself but can be mentioned only briefly here. A
driver of a truck ran over two cardboard boxes in a street; assuming that
he.could have avoided hitting the boxes through the exercise of reasonable
care, the additional point arises as to his liability for the death of and
injuries to children playing within the boxes. Could he have foreseen
the risk involved in his negligent act? More narrowly, could he have
foreseen the class of liability such as personal injury as opposed to property
damage, that would arise? And, is not the problem merely a circumlocution
for the question: was there any duty at all? The court felt that the jury
should answer the question, and, as might be thought, separate juries
disagreed.
Attractive Nuisance.-It is generally understood that land owners do
not owe a duty in negligence to injured trespassers, but this defense is
not always available if the trespassers are children. rhe court recently
considered two cases in which plaintiffs unsuccessfully sought to recover
under the doctrine of attractive nuisance.39  In Johns v. Clay Electrical
Co-op Ass'n.40 the court denied recovery when a trespassing child was
injured by electricity from wires covered by the foliage of a holly tree.
In dissent, Justices Terrell and Chapman felt that the red berries constituted
a perfect attraction for rural youth and that the landowner should be
responsible for injuries or death resulting to boys at play within the
branches. 4' And in a different setting the court, without dissent, affirmed
a summary judgment in favor of a defendant water company in whose
sand-banked pool a child had drowned.42
35. § 460 (1934).
36. 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
37. 62 So.2d 715 (Fla. 1952).
38. Justices Sebring, Thomas and Mathews dissented.
39. The leading American case is generally said to be Keffe v. Milwaukee & St. Patti
Ry., 21 Minn. 207, 18 Am. Rep. 393 (1875). See also RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 339
(1934).
40. 50 So.2d 710 (Pa. 1951).
41. Cf. ROBERT FROST, COLLECTED POEMS, Birches (1939).
42. Lomas v. West Palm Beach Water Co., 57 So.2d 881 (Ha. 1952). This
decision affirmed the rules in Allen v. McDonald, 42 So.2d 706 (Fla. 1949) and
depended in part on the fairly remote setting of the pool, its grading, and other
features eliminating the notion of a trap. Cf. Mr. Justice Holmes view in United Zinc
& Chemical Co. v. Britt, 258 U.S. 268 (1921), now generally discarded. See also
Florida Synopsis, 7 MIAMI L.Q. 90 (1952).
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Res Ipsa Loquitur.-Litigants argued in five cases that the rule of
res ipsa loquitur should be applied in aid of proving negligence on the
part of the defendants. The court, however, invoked the rule in one
situation only: a patient in a hospital was burned, and the court allowed
the presumption of negligence to arise against the hospital.43  The major
difficulty to a successful application of the rule is the requirement that
the defendant have sole and exclusive use of the instrumentality that causes
the injury."4  The judges tend to find this element lacking. Thus, in
Schott v. Pancoast Properties45 a plaintiff was hit by a screen that fell
from a hotel window. The owners of the hotel avoided the application
of res ipsa oquitur by showing that the window cleaners were independent
contractors.40 The court also refused to apply the doctrine in the case
where the plaintiff was injured by a fan that may or may not have been
turned on in his presence 7 and in a case involving a passenger who was
injured when a bus stopped abruptly.48
II. Contributory Fault and Defenses
Contributory negligence.-Once negligence is shown, the most frequent
defense is contributory negligence. Certain conduct, the court says, amounts
to contributory negligence as a matter of law. This has included such
acts as diving into an empty swimming pool,4 walking into a scaffold in
a lighted hall,50 stumbling over the edge of an elevator raised four inches
above the floor level,"' and colliding at high speed with a parked vehicle. 2
In other cases, very difficult to distinguish factually, the court holds in
substance that the injured person's negligence was the sole proximate cause
43. West Coast Hospital Ass'n v. Webb, 52 So.2d 803 (Fla. 1951). Previously
the court had held res ipsa loquitur inapplicable in an action against a physician for
negligent treatment of a patient. Grubbs v. McShane, 144 Fla. 505, 198 So. 208 (1940);
Foster v. Thornton, 125 Fla. 699, 170 So. 459 (1936). In Wilson v. Lee Memorial
Hospital, 65 So.2d 40 (Fla. 1953), the court said that the hospital would be liable
for a negligent operation during which a sponge was sewed into the stomach of a
charity patient provided that the jury found the nurses and surgeons to be agents of
the hospital.
44. For the traditional statements see Yarbrough v. Ball U-Drive System, 48 So.2d
82 (la. 1950).
45. 57 So.2d 431 (Fla. 1952).
46. But see Stuyvesant Corp. v. Stahl, 62 So.2d 18 (Fla. 1952) where by virtue
of apparent authority an independent contractor bound a hotel by his actions.
47. Frash v. Sarres, 60 So.2d 924 (Fla. 1952).
48. Tampa Transit Lines v. Corbin, 62 So.2d 10 (Fla. 1952). See also Laughlin
v. Loftin, 62 So.2d 745 (Fla. 1952) (to which two Justices dissented; and to which
Justice Terrell felt that res ipsa loquitur was applicable).
49. Ryan v. Unity, Inc., 55 So.2d 117 (Fla. 1951).
50. Breau v. Whitmore, 59 So.2d. 748 (Fla. 1952).
51. MacMillan v. Insurance Exchange Bldg. Inc., 58 So.2d 163 (1952).
52. Petroleum Carrier Corp. v. Robbins, 52 So.2d 666 (Fla. 1951).
The contributory negligence of a plaintiff who stepped backward from a walkway
across a culvert was so flagrant that it appeared on the face of the declaration. Faulk
v. Parrish, 58 So.2d 523 (Fla. 1952).
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of the accident.53 Plaintiffs who had this type of difficulty include one who
walked into a glass door,5 4 one who fell while walking down a hotel stairway
which was pitch black as the result of an unavoidable power failure,55 and
one who stumbled over a box in an aisle of a supermarket.56 While there
is, of course, a theoretical difference in these two lines of cases, the result
is the same for the unrewarded plaintiff. Certainly in a majority of cases,
however, the court holds that the question of contributory negligence is
for the jury. Typical questions of this sort are: whether an experienced
caddy should have seen a golf ball which struck him;5 7 whether a fruit-picker
who was electrocuted should have seen power wires strung above a trcc
in which he was working 8 and whether a sickly, obese woman who fell
while standing in a bus should have boarded it knowing that no seat was
available.59
Assumption of risk.-The defense of assumption of risk arose twice
and in each instance barred recovery. A mail carrier loaded mail on a
moving train and in turning away stepped on a rock which caused him to
fall under the train. He knew of the rock ballast along the track, and lie
knew that the train would make an extended stop in a few moments.
Under the circumstances, by attempting to load the moving train he
"assumed the risk."60  A tenant of an apartment building renewed her
lease monthly over an extended period knowing that water collected on
an inside stairway each time it rained. Assumption of risk was one reason
given by the court for denying a claim for injuries suffered on the wet
stairs.6 ' Implied in a third case is the notion that the guest who rides
in an automobile with a drunk driver may assume the risk.
02
Imputed negligence.-Imputed negligence was a complete defense in
53. E.g., Conet v. Evans, 66 So.2d 53 (Fla. 1953); Embrey v. Southern Gas &
Electric Corp., 63 So.2d 258 (la. 1953). Cf. Richmond v. Florida Power & Light Co.,
58 So.2d 687 (Fla. 1952).
54. Pettigrew v. Nite-Cap, Inc., 63 So.2d 492 (Fla. 1953).
55. Feigen v. Sokolsky, 65 So.2d 769 (Fla. 1953). After a prior trial of this
same case the court reversed a plaintiff's verdict because the court below had failed
to give a charge on contributory negligence. Apparently evidence of contributory
ngligence was much stronger at the second trial. Sokolsky v. Feigen 49 So.2d 88
(Fla. 1950).
56. Frederich's Market v. Knox, 66 So.2d 251 (FVa. 1953). Cf. Loftin v. Bryan,
63 So.2d 310 (Fla. 1953) and Miami v. Fuller, 54 So.2d 198 (Fla. 1951), automobile
cases in which the court held that the sole proximate cause of the accident was the
negligence of the drivers of the cars in which the plaintiffs were passengers.
57. Miller v. Rollings, 56 So.2d 137 (Fla. 1951).
58. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Tampa Elee. Co. 60 So.2d 179 (Fla. 1952).
59. Miami Transit Co. v. Scott, 58 So.2d 542 (Fla. 1952). See also Rodi v.
Florida Greyhound Lines, Inc., 62 So.2d 355 (Fla. 1952); Smith v. Cobb, 61 So.2d
379 (la. 1952); Mortz v. Kruger, 58 So.2d 160 (Fla. 1952).
60. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Savary, 64 So.2d 562 (Fla. 1953).
61. Atlantic Terrace Co. v. Rosen, 56 So.2d 444 (Fla. 1952). Also see note 7
supra.
62. Hurly v. Carter, 63 So.2d 192 (Fla. 1953). Also a person who is bitten
by a dog assumes the risk if the owner has posted a sign, Romfh v. Berman, 56 So.2d
127 (Fla. 1951).
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an action by a passenger of an automobile.63 After deciding that the
driver's negligence was the sole proximate cause of a collision with a
train, the court held that the driver's negligence could be imputed to the
passenger because they had spent the evening together on a wild drinking
party. An ingenious argument for imputed negligence was also advanced
by counsel for the defendant in a suit brought by a Puerto Rican husband
and wife. It was said that the negligence of the husband driver should be
imputed to the wife because the car in which they were riding was
jointly owned under Puerto Rican law, a community property jurisdiction,
where negligence is imputed by virtue of the relationship. This argument
was successfully rebutted by urging the law of the forum.
64
Last clear chance.-Despite a showing that the plaintiff was con-
tributorily negligent, he has of course the final opportunity to recover
on the basis that the defendant had the last clear chance. The doctrine
is applied rather sparingly in Florida. 5  During the last two years the
court discussed the issue in five cases and in two cases66 permitted
recovery by plaintiffs. Both of these cases involved negligent drivers who
ran into trains, and in both instances the court agreed that there was
evidence that the engineers could have avoided the accident by doing
some act, such as sounding the horn, since in each, the engineers saw
the approaching vehicles. In Miami Transit Co. v. Goff,6 ' the court
held that a bus driver did all he could under the circumstances of
inclement weather to avoid the oncoming accident, and the justices
consequently found that a charge of last clear chance was inappropriate
for the jury. 68
III. Vicarious Liability
There were two significant decisions treating the problem of whether
the driver of a vehicle was operating it with the owner's permission so
as to permit the plaintiff to invoke the dangerous instrumentality doctrine
and then make the owners liable in damages. In one case 0 the court
63. Loftin v. Bryan, 63 So.2d 310 (Fla. 1953).
64. Astor Electric Service v. Cabrera, 62 So.2d 759 (Fla. 1952).
65. See for a general discussion of this problem, Steinhardt & Simon, Florida's
Last Clear Chance Doctrine, 7 MIAMI L.Q. 457 (1953).
66. Poindexter v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 56 So.2d 905 (lla. 1951); Seaboard
Air Line R.R. v. Martin, 66 So.2d 509 (Fla. 1951). But see Mothershed v. Atlantic
Coast Line R.R., 64 So.2d 266 (Fla. 1953), a per curiam opinion without discussion
except for Mr. Justice Drew's dissenting opinion.
67. 66 So.2d 487 (Fla. 1953).
68. See also State v. North Miami, 58 So.2d 552 (Fla. 1952). But see Panama
City Transit Co. v. DuVernog, 33 So.2d 48 (Fla. 1948). A federal court in
interpreting Florida law also refused to apply the doctrine on the basis that the
defendant did not have ample time to avoid the accident. Humphries v. Boersma,
190 F.2d 843 (5th Cir. 1951). These cases indicate, as Judge Russell states it, that
'proximate cause,' 'sole negligence,' 'contributory negligence,' 'concurring negligence,'
and 'last clear chance' are not absolutes."
69. Sykes v. Babijuice Corp., 63 So.2d 65 (fla. 1953).
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affirmed a directed verdict for the defendant based on lack of permission.
The driver, employed as a night watchman, had no authority to removc
vehicles from the defendant's premises, although le could move thel
about the parking lot when necessary. He had no driver's license, had been
refused employment as a truck driver and at the time of the accident
he was driving one of the defendant's trucks on a personal mission. In
the other case,70 custody of a truck was given to the driver for the
purpose of transporting a working crew. He was allowed to keep the
truck at home, but it was to be used only for hauling the crew. When
the accident occurred apparently he was on a personal mission, contrary
to instructions. The holding of the court that permission to use in the
first instance is not voided by instructions limiting the use, represents a
continuation of the broad interpretation of permission announced in
Lynch v. Walker.71
Two other cases were decided involving the question of ownership.
In its search for solvent defendants, the court indicates a willingness to
stretch the ownership concept as far as it has stretched the concept of
permission. For example, the lessor and the lessee of a truck were both
held liable for an accident, since the court found that each had sufficient
title or dominion to make each responsible to injured parties. 72
Occasionally it is difficult to ascertain when title passes to an automobile
and when one person relinquishes dominion to another. rlhe court has
stated that these problems will be determined by common law rules and
not simply by reading the Motor Vehicle Law73 which provides specific
means for transferring vehicle titles.7 4
Vicarious liability was urged in other than dangerous instrumentality
cases. A Miami Beach hotel was held liable for damages to an individual
injured by an employee of a doorman, despite a showing that the doorman
was an independent contractor. 5
IV. Statutory Problems
'Workmen's comrPensation.-In Smith v. Arnold 6 the court held that
an employer who hires minors in violation of the Child Labor Law 77 cannot
limit his liability within the scope of the Workmen's Compensation Act,'8
70. Chase & Co. v. Benefield. 64 So.2d 922 (Fla. 1953).
71. 159 Fla. 188, 31 So.2d 268 (1947). See Note, 5 FLA. L. RF.v. 412 (1952).
72. Wilson v. Burke, 53 So.2d 319 (Fla. 1951). le court said that those liable
are those ". . . who exerted such dominion over the truck as to be responsible for
damage caused by it."
73. FLA. STAT. § 319.22 (1953).
74. Razz v. Hurd, 60 So.2d 673 (Fla. 1952).
75. Stuyvesant Corp. v. Stahl, 62 So.2d 18 (Fla. 1952). But see Schott v.
Pancoast Properties, 57 So.2d 431 (Fla. 1952).
76. 60 So.2d 281 (Fla. 1952).
77. FLA. STAT. C. 450 (1953).
78. FIA. STAT. c. 440 (1953).
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if the minor dies and an action for his death is brought under the Death
by Wrongful Act Statute.19 The result, though possibly desirable, depended
somewhat on a play on words:
It therefore follows as a matter of legislative intent that the
Legislature in using the words 'whether lawfully or unlawfully
employed' had reference only to minors who could be lawfully
employed .80
This decision seems to give minors, who under no circumstances could
be lawfully employed, an election to file a claim for workmen's compensation
or to sue at law,81 despite the theory of the Workmen's Compensation
Act. However, in the ease of a minor, lawfully employed, who is killed
on the job, the court interpreted the act to preclude the decedent's
father from the right of an action under the Death by Wrongful Act
Statute to recover damages for mental pain and suffering.82
The Workmen's Compensation Act was further interpreted in Fidelity
Casualty Co. of New York v. Bedingfield 3 to allow an injured employee
to bring his suit against a tortfeasor, not his employer, without bringing
the suit also for the use and benefit of the employer's insurance carrier.
Further, the employer is not entitled to intervene as a party plaintiff. The
remedy of the carrier is, of course, to file a claim in the suit for an
appropriate lien.
Death By Wrongful Act Statute.-Although several cases arose within
the scope of the Death by Wrongful Act Statute,84 the only important
interpretation of the Act itself occurred in Whitely v. Webb's City,5
which construed the act to preclude actions arising ex contractu. The
legislature, however, amended the act thereafter to include both actions
in tort and contract.
The Guest Statute.-The Florida Guest Statute 0 received the attention
of the court in five cases. These opinions continued the interpretation
that the terms in the statute "gross negligence" and "wilful or wanton
misconduct" are synonomous.8 7  It is still a problem to predict whether
79. FLA. STAT. § 768.01 (1953).
80. Smith v. Arnold, 60 So.2d 281, 282 Fla. 1952).
81. But se a different interpretation in 7 M.M: L.Q. 278 (1953).
82. Howze v. Lykes Bros., 64 So.2d 277 (1953).
83. 60 So.2d 489 (Fla. 1952), 7 MIAMI L.Q. 272 (1953).
84. FLA. STAT. § 768.01 (1953). For typical cases not involving problems of
construction see Horton v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 61 So.2d 406 (Fla. 1952); Atlantic
Coast Line R.R. v. Gary, 57 So.2d 10 (Fla. 1953).
85. 55 So.2d 730 (Ra. 1953).
86. FLA. STAT. § 320.59 (1953).
87. DeWald v. Quarnstrom, 60 So.Zd 919 (Fla. 1952); Dexter v. Green, 55 So.2d
548 (Fla. 1951). The former cases indicating a brief period of inconsistency in the
definition of these words are reviewed in 4 FLA. L. Rnv. 79 (1951). The two terms are
connected by the word "or," which the court has definitely ruled as conjunctive,
making the two phrases synonomous; Cormier v. Williams, 148 Fla. 201, 4 So.2d 525
(1941).
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a particular set of facts indicates the necessary quantum of negligence or
irrational behavior on the part of defendants to permit plaintiffs to bring
successful causes of action. The court, notwithstanding the mandate of
the statute that the determination of sufficient negligence in these cases
is a matter for the jury, painstakingly considers each situation under its
authority, as in non-statutory cases, to review findings of fact to accord
with relevant principles of law."8
The problem remains more than one of matching the current case
with past adjudications. Fewer than forty cases constitute the body of
stare dccisis; thus, it is to be expected that new facts will continue to
arise for the court to characterize, on the one hand, as negligent situations,
precluding recovery for the plaintiff and, on the other, as gross-negligent
situations, permitting recovery.80
In Bryan Y. Bryan9" the plaintiff failed to recover from a driver who
fell asleep but who had not been drinking and whose conduct had satisfied
the guest up until the moment of the accident. 1 But the court held
in a later case that a drunken driver can defend a suit successfully by
invoking the doctrines of contributory negligence and assumption of risk.12
If the guest warns a speeding driver, the court indicated that recovery
is more likely, 3 even though speed alone, without warning, falls short of
constituting gross negligence. 4
The most debatable case in the group involved an action brought
by a plaintiff against a deceased driver who, though he had looked south,
failed to look north before making a turn. The court in permitting the
guest to recover stated that the question was properly for the jury whose
findings should not be disturbed. 5 Failure, then, to look must be
contrasted with misjudgment of a situation."
The Jones Act.-Of passing importance is the one case the court
interpreted under the Jones Act.07  The question was essentially whether
a member of the crew of a dredge engaged in filling land is a seaman
within the scope of the Act. The court found upon an examination of
88. See Nelson v. McMillion, 151 Fla. 847, 10 So.2d 565 (1942); Cormier v.
Williams, 148 Fla. 201, 4 So.2d 525 (1941); 4 FLA. L. REv. 79, 85 (1951).
89. See generally Middleton, Judicial Review of Findings of Fact in Florida, 3
FLA. L. Rv. 281 (1950); Fla. Synopsis, 7 IVIAMI L.Q. 90 (1952).
90. 59 So.2d 513 (Fla. 1952).
91. Cf. Wismer v. Marx, 289 Mich. 38, 286 N.W. 149 (1939) (plaintiff could
not recover even though driver fell asleep twice at the wheel).
92. Henry v. Carter, 63 So.2d 192 (Fla. 1953).
93. Dexter v. Green, 55 So.2d 548 (Fla. 1951).
94. Ayers v. Morgan, 42 So.2d 2 (Yla. 1949); Leslie v. West, 33 So.2d 821
(Fla. 1949).
95. Motes v. Prosby, 65 So.2d 478 (Fla. 1953).
96. Juhasz v. Barton, 146 Fla. 484, 1 So.2d 476 (1941); Koger v. Hollahan,
144 Fla. 779, 198 So. 685 (1940).
97. 46 U.S.C. § 688.
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the facts that the plaintiff was not engaged in aiding navigation and was
not entitled to this special relief.08
Railroad statutes.-Several cases were decided applying miscellaneous
doctrines peculiar to railroads and their operation. In an action under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act for injuries resulting from a boiler
explosion, the court approved a jury finding that the sole proximate cause
of the accident was the negligence of the plaintiff engineer who was operating
the boiler. Two justices dissented, contending that there was evidence of
negligence sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to a verdict as a matter of
law in view of the absolute duty imposed on the railroad by the Federal
Safety Appliance Act.91 The court reversed a verdict in favor of another
railroad employee who struck his head on a gutter as he climbed the
side of a freight car after being given a "hurry up" order. The clearance
provided was admittedly inadequate; but since the workman knew of this
condition, the court decided that his negligence was the sole proximate
cause of the accident. 0 This decision indicates that the Florida Supreme
Court construes this type of case more conservatively than the United
States Supreme Court currently advocates.' 0 '
The presumption 02 and comparative negligence' 03 statutes were applied
for the benefit of the plaintiff in a suit resulting from a collision between
a boy on a motor bike and a standing train. The defendant unsuccessfully
contended that the statutes are applicable only to moving trains. 04
V. A Study in Slip and Fall
The court considered a series of cases involving the problem presented
when an individual falls or otherwise injures himself because of a structural
98. Covington v. Standard Dredging Corp., 61 So.2d 644 (Fla. 1952).
99. Laughlin v. Loftin, 62 So,2d 745 (Fla. 1952), cert. denied, 74 Sup. Ct.
22 (1953).
100. Loftin v. Joyner, 60 So.2d 154 (Fla. 1952).
101. See DeParcq, A Decade of Progress Under the Federal Employers' Liability Act,
18 L w AND CONTEMP. PRO. 257 (1953). In Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Hardee, 54
So.2d 809 (Fla. 1951) the evidence was sufficient to submit to a jury and a verdict
for the workman was affirmed.
102. FLA. STAT. § 768.05 (1953).
103. FLA..STAT. § 768.06 (1953).
104. I'lorn v. Louisville & Nashville R.R, 61 So.2d 406 (Fla. 1952); Florida
Synopsis, 7 MIAMI L.Q. 413 (1953). In another crossing accident case, the court
appropriately held that the "standing train" doctrine does not apply so as to eliminate
liability while the train is in fact moving and arrives at the crossing only moments
before the plaintiff's automobile. Goff v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 53 So.2d 777 (Fla.
1951). Cf. Loftin v. Bryan, 63 So.2d 310 (Fla. 1953). And the court ruled that the
question of whether a 'sudden emergency" resulting from an automobile on the track
necessitated a hurried stop which caused injury to a passenger was properly submitted
to a jury. Loftin v. Anderson, 66 So.2d 470 (Fla. 1953). In the only decision found
involving loss of baggage the court applied the generally accepted rule that unless the
railroad has exclusive control of baggage the duty owed is reasonable care instead of
the usual duty owed by a common carrier. Chafin v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 58
So.2d 185 (1952).
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condition or because of foreign matter under foot. For want of a more
descriptive generic term these are called the slip and fall cases, and though
they involve doctrines applicable to other type situations, they can con-
veniently be treated separately.
The traditional view is that the proprietor of a public place is liable
for injuries resulting from falls on foreign matter when it is shown 1) that
the owner created the condition; 2) that the owner knew of the condition;
or 3) that the condition had existed for a sufficient length of time so that
the owner, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have discovered it.
The last of these elements has received considerable recent attention.
Kraver v. Edelson'0 5 is an example of an attempt by a plaintiff to
predicate liability on notice to the defendant, merely by virtue of passage
of time. The court, however, decided that a trampled cigar butt which
caused the plaintiff to fall and which had been in a hotel entrance for
only ten minutes did not alone show sufficient evidence of negligence to
submit the issue to a jury.
In the next decision involving the problem, Mr. Justice Terrell
re-examined and repudiated notice as a basis of liability in cases involving
supermarkets.' 00  The plaintiff in that case fell on a string bean. There
was no testimony as to how long the bean had been on the floor and
none as to how it got there. There was testimony, however, that the bin
was constructed in such a way that it was likely that beans would fall
on the floor when the bin was full. The court decided that the facts
were sufficient to warrant submitting the question of negligence to the
jury. Three justices dissented, and Mr. Justice Terrell wrote a special
concurring opinion in which no one joined. In that opinion he asserts
the view that notice to the defendant founded on a time interval which
lie calls the "reasonable care rule" should not be the basis for liability in
cases involving super markets. Rather, he would submit to the jury the
question of whether it was unreasonable under the circumstances for the
defendant to allow the particular substance to be on the floor, even
without evidence as to how the offending object got on the floor or of
how long it had been there. Such a rule had already been adopted by
the court in a case involving a bottle at a race track, but its application
had been expressly limited to ". . . a place of amusement like a race
track where patrons go by the thousands on invitation of the proprietors,
and are permitted to purchase and drink bottled beverages of different
kinds and set the empty bottles anywhere they may find space to place
them ...."107
105. 55 So.2d 179 (Fla. 1951).
106. Carls Markets v. IN Feo, 55 So.2d 182 (Fla. 1951).
107. Wells v. Palm Beach Kennel Club, 160 Fla. 502, 35 So.2d 720 (1948). One
plaintiff who fell on a rock at the Hialeah race course might have had the benefit of
the Wells doctrine had she not entered a special gate by using a press pass. Actually
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Many thought that this view represented the opinion of a majority
of the court. 0 1. In subsequent decisions, however, the court clearly indicated
its intention to predicate liability on notice based on a time interval.
The notice rule was reviewed in detail in Carls Markets v. Meyer.00 Two
allegations of negligence were made in the complaint in that case: the
defendant had caused a slippery mass to be placed on the floor; or the
substance had remained on the floor for such a length of time that the
defendant knew or should have known about it. The trial court refused
to instruct the jury to the effect that if they did not find that the foreign
matter had been placed on the floor by the defendant's employees then
they must find, in order to fix liability on the defendant, that it had been
present for a sufficient length of time so that the defendant in the exercise
of reasonable care could have discovered it. Refusal to give this charge,
the court held, was reversible error. Mr. Justice Terrell's prior concurring
opinion on which the plaintiff relied was courteously rejected:
We are impelled to point out, with profound deference to the
author, that the opinion from which appellees generously quote
was a special concurring opinion of one member of the Court in
which no other member joined.
Meanwhile the justices decided other cases involving injuries by falls.
These cases turned on issues other than notice. In a suit against a landlord,
the court denied recovery to a tenant who slipped on a rubber mat located
on an outside stairway which was wet from rain."0  Since the plaintiff
had used the stairway many times, knew that it was wet, and knew that
the mat was not fastened down, the court held that the sole proximate
cause of the accident was the plaintiff's negligence, especially since there
was a dry stairway available at another part of the building. Another
tenant had a similar experience, finding that each time it rained, water
collected on an inside common stairway of an apartment building because
of a broken window; but nevertheless she continued to renew her lease
monthly for several years. On the day she was injured the water was
there as usual, but this time she fell when she stepped in it. The court
reversed a jury verdict in her favor and ruled that under the circumstances
she had assumed the risk, again, since there was another stairway
she was not a member of the press which made her a trespasser to whom the track
did not owe the duty of reasonable care. Satin v. Hialeah Race Course, 65 So.2d 475
(fla. 1953).
108. Messner v. Webb's City, 62 So.2d 66 (Fa. 1953). Store owner not liable
to one who fell on a nail since there was no evidence as to length of time nail had
been on the floor. Mr. Justice rerrell concurred. Apparently he is willing to extend
the race track nile only to supermarkets not superdrug stores. Marks v. Cals Markets,
62 So.2d 739 (Fla. 1952) (directed verdict for defendant affirmed on substantially
the same facts as the De Feo case). See also Myers, Causation and Common Sense, 5
MiAis L.Q. 238 (1950).
109. 69 So.2d 789 (Fa. 1953).
110. Gonet v. Evans, 66 So.2d 53 (Fla. 1953).
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available.I In a third decision, involving a mishap on a wet surface,
the court ruled that water splashed by bathers on a walkway near a
swimming pool is a necessary incident to the operation of a pool and
does not give a cause of action to one who slips on the wet walk. 112
Injuries caused by objects which might be expected in public places
brought about several other opinions in favor of the defendant. It is not
evidence of negligence, the court decided, to have a large mat in the
entrance to a cafeteria. The danger, if any, should have been obvious
to the one who tripped on the edge of it.113  In a similar case approval
was given to the dismissal of a complaint which alleged that a fall was
caused by a three-inch drop in the floor just inside the door of an automobile
showroom. 114  In another recent supermarket case, the plaintiff's "failure
to fend for herself" rather than the defendant's negligence, caused her to
trip over a small box in the aisle of the store.115
The court did find evidence of negligence, however, in an action
against the owner when one who had rented a beach cottage walked off
a bulkhead and fell to the ground while on a stroll toward the beach at
night.1 6 A dangerous condition giving a cause of action was also found
in a case involving a hotel guest. The guest fell on a rolled-up bath mat
in an inadequately lighted room which she had just rented." 7
VI. Contract or Tort
Throughout the country the courts increasingly hold that vendors of
defective goods are liable to their purchasers, remote consumers, and other
third parties.1 This result is accomplished by the use of the implied
warranty theory, the Uniform Sales Act, by stretching the law of negligence,
and by employing other technical devices. Florida remains abreast of this
modern trend without benefit of the Uniform Sales Act; to do so, requires
the court to reflect both tort and contract influences."9  For example, it
was recently held that disappointed purchasers of watermelon seed are
allowed to recover when they discover that what they planted did not
in fact produce the variety of watermelon advertised, and these purchasers
111. Atlantic Terrace Co. v. Rosen, 56 So.2d 444 (Fla. 1952).
112. Andrews v. Narber, 59 So.2d 869 (Fla. 1952).
113. Earley v. Morrison Cafeteria Co., 61 So.2d 477 (Fla. 1952).
114. Bowles v. Elkes Pontiac Co., 63 So.2d 769 (Fla. 1952).
115. Frederich's Market v. Knox, 66 So.2d 251 (Fla. 1953).
116. Mertz v. Krueger, 58 So.2d 160 (Fla. 1952).
117. Rubey v. William Morris, Inc., 66 So.2d 218 (Fla. 1953).
118. For an excellent recent article on this problem see Keeton, Rights of
Disappointed Purchasers, 32 TexAs L. REv. 1 (1953).
119. For the contract theory see Jennings, The Implied Warranty Theory of
Liability Recently Adopted in Florida, 28 FLA. L.J. 46 (1954); Comment, 3 FLA. L.
RFv. 380 (1950); for the problem of res ipsa l(xluitur see Comment, I FLA. L. Rev.
470 (1948).
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can go against remote vendors even in the absence of priority of contract. 120
However, in Lambert v. Sistrunk1'2 ' the court refused recovery for injuries
to a purchaser of a stepladder, since any defect in the ladder was patent
at the time of purchase, and the seller made no representations beyond
normal shop talk. Conversely, a purchaser of a Coca-Cola recovered against
the manufacturer for injuries resulting from a foreign substance in the
bottle'21 ol the theory, in this instance, of implied warranty, rather than
negligence. The distinction between tort and contract became of more
than academic interest in Whitley v. Webb's City123 where the court
construed the Death by Wrongful Act Statute to preclude the survival of
actions ex contractu. The legislature has, however, amended the statute
to include both tort and contract actions. 24
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY AND COROLLARY RULES
In a series of recent cases the Florida Supreme Court reconsidered
the severely criticised doctrine of municipal immunity in tort through
which courts permit cities to escape financial responsibilty for wrongful
acts committed by them in a governmental capacity as distinct from a
corporate capacity.2 5 The first case in the recent series arose when a
plaintiff sought damages from a city as a result of an alleged beating by
municipal officers.' 26  The judge denied recovery on the theory that
the acts of policemen are governmental, and that cities are immune
from liability even though the policemen as individuals may be liable.
Mr. Justice Hobson, however, in a searching concurring opinion questioned
the rationale of the theory and stated that the time had come to abandon
the governmental-corporate dichotomy. Justices Terrell and Roberts
dissented from the majority holding. In a second case, the court divided
four to three and denied a wife the right to recover for the wrongful death
of her husband, who, as a prisoner, perished in flames when the city jail
burned."' Despite this sharp division, the possibility is slight that the
120. Corneli Seed Co. v. Ferguson, 64 So.2d 162 (Fla. 1953); Haskins v. Jackson
Grain Co., 63 So.2d 514 (Fla. 1953). Cf. First Nat. Bank in Tarpon Springs v, Bliss,
56 So.2d 922 (Fla. 1952).
121. 58 So.2d 434 (Fla. 1952).
122. Florida Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 62 So.2d 910 (Fla. 1953). The
court relied on the leading Florida case of Blanton v. Cudahy Packing Co., 154 Fla.
872, 19 So.2d 313 (1944); See also Smith v. Burdine's, 144 Fla. 500, 198 So. 223
(1940).
123. 55 So.2d 730 (Fla. 1951).
124. FLA. STAT. § 768.01 (1953).
125. For a review of this problem see Price & Smith, Municipal Tort Liability:
A Continual Enigma, 6 FLA. L. Riv. 330 (1953).
126. Miami v. Bethel, 65 So.2d 34 (Fla. 1953). This case moreover involves a
serious civil liberties problem in that it denies a substantial remedy for an invaded right.
Cf. the dissenting opinion of Justice Murphy in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 US. 25,
48 (1949).
127. Williams v. Green Cove Springs, 65 So.2d 56 (Fla. 1953).
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court in the future will decide to treat municipal corporations exactly as
it treats private corporations; for in Britt v. Ocala'" the court reaffirmed
its position regarding municipal immunity and denied the right of an
injured person to recover from a city whose employees took him into
custody but deprived him of proper care.
The problem then remains one of defining which functions are
corporate and which are proprietary, and happily the court describes most
functions as corporate: the care of streets, sidewalks, bridges; the operation
of public utilities, drainage systems, hospitals, airports, parks, swimming
pools, and bathing beaches)2 0  Of course, in these cases the normal
defenses to tort liability available to private corporations and individuals
remain available to municipalities. 30 In additon, muncipalities continue
to obtain an advantage in the special thirty, sixty, and ninety-day provisions
for notice that are found in the city charters,'' and the court is construing
these provisions with strictness. For example, in Miami Springs i.
Lassiter,132 the court held that the notice requirement was not met when
the plaintiff gave an unsigned statement to the city's liability insurance
adjuster, and in still another case the court held insufficient a notice tht
set out the time of the accident but did not mention the place.' Finally,
the cities continue to obtain special consideration from at least a brace
of statutes: the one-year statute of limitations1 4 and the statute making
certain roads the responsibility of the State Road Department and not
of the city. 3 5
As would be expected, in order to overcome the rigors of these
developments that limit municipal liability, the court has manipulated the
legal concepts to grant relief to plaintiffs in especially aggravated cases.
Thus, in two cases the judges stated that the causes of action sounded in
128. 65 So.2d 753 (Fla. 1953).
129. E.g., Mullis v. Miami, 60 So.2d 174 (Fla. 1952) (woman stepped into a
hole in the street); Daytona Beach v. Humphreys, 53 So.2d 871 (Fla. 1951)(woman
tripped in hole in sidewalk).
130. Miami v. Fuller, 54 So.2d 198 (Fla. 1951)(car pitched over bulkhead
throgugh driver's negligence).
131. Specific form of the notice varies from city to city. That of St. Petersburg
may be taken as typical. FMa. Spec. Laws 1937, c. 18896, provides:
.. no suit shall be instituted or maintained against the City of St.
Petersburg, Florida, for damages arising out of any personal injury unless
written notice of such claim or injury is within sixty days from the date of
receiving alleged injury, given to the City Manager of the City of St. Petersburg
with specifications as to the time and place of said alleged injury.
132. 60 So.2d 774 (Fla. 1952) (three justices dissented).
133. Oliver v. St. Petersburg, 65 So.2d 71 (Fla. 1953) (three justices dissented).
134. FLA. STAT. § 95.24 (1951). In Christian v. Sarasota the court held that the
Statute of Limitations barred an action, even though the plaintiff did not discover the
injuries complained of until eighteen months after the accident.
135. Leialoba v. Jacksonville, 64 So.2d 924 (Fla. 1953) held that where by statute
the State Road Department is responsible for maintenance of a road, the city is thereby
relieved. See Fi.A. STAT. § 341.64 (1953). However, in Gay v. Southern Builders, Inc.,
66 So.2d 499 (Fla. 1953) the court showed a desire to permit injured parties to recover
from the state by a decision that placed an action or contract rather than in tort.
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contract rattcr than in tort with the consequence that the cities were
liable in damages.l"a Despite the traditional concept that the state and
its subdivisions, the counties, are completely inmunie from tort liability," '
our Supreme Court has permitted recovery by a plaintiff in a case arising
from a hospital operated by a county. 8  The legislature continues to add
statutes that permit counties, through insurance plans, to meet ilic
rcasou lle expectatiolis of injured persons, especially school children. ""
136. Golf v. Ft. Lauderdale, 65 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1953); Holbrook v. Sarasota, 58 So.2d
862 (1ia. 1952).
137. Bragg v. Board of Public lnstr'n, 160 Fla. 590, 36 So.2d 222 (1948); Keggin
v. Ilillsborough County, 71 Fla. 356, 71 So. 272 (1916).
138. Suwanee County Hospital Corp. v. Golden, 56 So.2d 911 (Fla. 1952).
139. Mla. I.aws 1953, c. 28205, 28220.
